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Gregory J. Till
Senior Thesis
A Chaotic Approach to Free Will and Determinism
I.

Introduction

The debate over free will and determinism presents itself as
perhaps the central and most vexing problem in Western
philosophy.

This problem can be expressed in a single sentence:

We feel we have freedom in our ability to make reasoned
decisions, yet this freedom is contradicted by the belief that
every event has a cause, implying that our actions are not free
but are determined.

This contradiction led Dr. Samuel Johnson to

sum up the problem with his slogan-like statement that "All
theory is against freedom of the will, all experience is for it"
{Kenny, 1).
This problem has an impact on the way we view the behavior
of others.

Do we act with freedom or is freedom simply an

illusion?

Furthermore, if it is an illusion, should we be

thought of as and held responsible for our actions?

The

importance and difficulty of this debate are suggested in the
problems the sciences of human action have had in placing
responsibility for actions.
This paper approaches this ancient problem by incorporating
the new science of chaos.

Chaos is the name given to the

discovery that even "simple deterministic systems with only a few
elements can generate random behavior" {Crutchfield et al., 46).
Chaos shows that deterministic systems can act in ways which are
not predictable while at the same time showing that many
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seemingly random phenomena are more explainable than once
thought.

By doing so, chaos alters the laws of causation upon

which much of this debate rests and indicates that perhaps not
all theory is against freedom of the will, despite Dr. Johnson's
statement to the contrary.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that while chaos
improves the case for determinism, it also shows that free will
might be possible in a world that otherwise appears to be
governed by universal efficient causality.

In showing this, the

paper is broken down into five sections, the first being this
introduction.

The second section reviews the free will and

determinism debate to establish a context for the conclusions and
to develop criteria for the advancement of each argument.

The

third section reviews the science of chaos to establish how it
may theoretically meet these criteria and to show how chaos may
be detected in behavior.

After that, specific evidence of the

link between chaos and behavior is sought, and in the fifth
section, final conclusions are drawn from this evidence to
fulfill the thesis.
II.

The Free Will and Determinism Debate

As just mentioned, this section will review the free will
and determinism argument for the dual purposes of developing a
framework for the conclusions and establishing criteria for the
strengthening of both arguments.

The two arguments are dealt

with separately in some detail to establish these criteria.

In

breaking down the arguments, the philosophical beliefs will be
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introduced first, followed by the scientific grounds for those
beliefs.

As the grounds for the respective beliefs are examined,

the particular criteria which must be met for each belief to be
strengthened will become clear.

Determinism is the thesis that every event is the effect of
an antecedent cause (Pujmon, 397), also known as the thesis of
universal efficient causality.

Since human actions are events,

they must be governed by these causal laws as well.

Our actions

are therefore determined and the belief that we have control over
our actions is illusory.

Free will is fiction in the

deterministic model, since our actions result not from it but
from the laws of causality.

In the words of Baron d' Holbach,

"Thus it must appear, that where all the causes are linked one to
the other, where the whole forms but one immense chain, there
cannot be any independent, any isolated energy; any detached
power" (1: 41).
Although free will does not exist in the deterministic
model, this is not necessarily the case with respect to the
concept of freedom.

Philosophical differences over freedom split

determinism into two separate beliefs.

These philosophical

differences over freedom can be outlined by the respective ways
they make sense of the statement, "The individual could have done
otherwise."

The two deterministic meanings for this statement

are known as hard determinism and compatibilism.
The deterministic argument known as hard determinism denies
that an individual could do otherwise, meaning that our belief in
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freedom is false.

The laws of causation dictate that everything

which has happened, had to happen.

As a result, our belief that

for any event we could have done otherwise is unreal, and freedom
does not exist.
Without the freedom to choose our actions, we cannot place
responsibility for those actions, and without responsibility we
cannot have morality.
without support.

Despite this, hard determinism is not

For instance, it provides a psychologically

powerful reason for religious belief, since faithful individuals
whose lives are unpleasant and seem beyond their control can hope
that there is a "master plan" in store for them by an omnipotent
being.
A famous proponent of hard determinism was attorney Clarence
Darrow.

Darrow stated his belief in a "human machine" determined

completely by heredity and environment (32).

He believed that

since our actions are determined we are not free, and that this
absence of freedom means that we should not be held responsible
for our actions (31).

His passionate statement of hard

determinism was crucial to his well-known defense of the
murderers Leopold and Loeb, and he succeeded in his attempts to
stave off the boys' execution.
Nevertheless, without the freedom to choose our actions, we
cannot place responsibility for those actions, and without
responsibility we cannot have morality.

This denial of freedom

and its consequences leads many to turn away from hard
determinism in favor of compatibilism.

Since hard determinism is
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not a widely accepted view, it will not be explicitly handled in
this paper.

Instead, compatibilism will receive most of the

attention given to determinism.
Compatibilism, or soft determinism, provides a second and
more subtle answer to the question of freedom.

The

compatibilists realize the need to bring morality back into
determinism and so argue that the statement "The individual could
have done otherwise," does not refer to freedom from causal laws
but to the ability to act without coercion from others.

For

instance, a person who decides to give a dollar to charity is
acting with freedom; a child who feels he has no option but to
give a dollar to the bully to prevent a beating is acting without
freedom.
This interpretation of freedom relies upon a distinction
between voluntary acts which are free from coercion and the laws
of causation which may ultimately determine those actions.

The

compatibilists understand our need for freedom and argue that the
causal processes which determine our actions are so far removed
from our experience of behavior that we do not apply physical
causal explanations to them (Bertalonffy, 221). For instance, we
tend to explain actions in term of thoughts, impulses, or
emotions rather than by unbreakable causal laws.

By explaining

actions in terms of motives, the laws of causality are bypassed
and freedom is allowed.
Another way of explaining the difference is by separating
statements of truth into those which are ultimately true and
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those which are conventionally true.

Ultimate truths are facts;

they are beliefs which agree with the world as our minds must
experience it.

They are not true merely by arbitrary agreement

but are more scientific in nature.

They are truths which await

our discovery, rather than our invention.

The universality of

the laws of causality has been held to be such a truth.
Conventional truths, on the other hand, are true only by
consensus.

They are agreed upon abstractions or terms which are

useful for our existence but have no truth value in themselves at
an ultimate level.

For the Western tradition of morality,

freedom has been one such conventional truth.

It is conventional

rather than ultimate because science does not show that freedom
exists on a physical, scientific level.

Instead, it is an

abstraction, agreed upon only by convention, which is useful in
effecting the actions of others by giving rise to responsibility
and morality.
Compatibilists can argue that the contradiction between
freedom and determinism arises when we fail to distinguish
between the two levels of truth.

If we attempt to equate

ultimate truths with conventional truths, we lose all
abstractions, including freedom.

However, since science must

also show it to be an ultimate truth that we have a need for
abstractions, the two levels of truth must be kept separate.
Thus, we can accept the conventional truth that we are free, even
if ultimately our actions are determined (Sidertis, 158).
Since compatibilism allows for freedom, morality can still
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exist.

But since freedom exists only by convention, moral

standards are not considered to be absolute and utilitarianism is
the norm.

Rewards and punishments for actions are generally

viewed in light of their effectiveness as incentives and
deterrents to future behavior (Pojmon, 414).

Such a view is

advanced by Ted Honderich in his essay "One determinism," where
he argues that people should be held responsible for their
actions even if they cannot be responsible in an ultimate sense,
stating that "a man is responsible for an action if his future
behavior can be affected by punishment" (206).
Compatibilism has been criticized for wanting it both way~.
Critics argue that we cannot be both free and determined; the two
are incompatible.

Despite this, determinism has some strong

scientific grounds for its adoption.

Having reviewed the

philosophical aspects of determinism argument, its scientific
basis will now be outlined in greater detail to ascertain in what
ways it could be improved.
Although the debate over free will and determinism goes back
to the early Greeks, the scientific basis of modern determinism
rests primarily upon the work of Newton.

Newton's work

substantially strengthened determinism, so much so that Newtonian
laws have often been put at the level of ultimate truth.

Newton

seemingly showed conclusively that the universe is governed by
laws of efficient causality.

He made the movement of bodies

describable solely in terms of physical and mathematical laws
that denied the possibility of any kind of causality outside of
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efficient causality, precluding the existence of free will.

The

ability to use these laws to predict the behavior of bodies gave
great strength to Newton's work.
This Newtonian conviction in prediction was stated in its
classic form by the French mathematician Pierre Simon de LaPlace:
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as
the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the
state which is to follow.

Given for one instant an

intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which
nature is animated and the respective situation of the
beings who compose it - an intelligence sufficiently vast to
submit these data to analysis - it would embrace in one
single formula the movements of the greatest bodies and
those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be
uncertain and the future, as well as the past, would be
present to its eyes (4).
Theoretical predictability has long been part of the
deterministic model.
I emphasize that all actions have been considered
theoretically predictable since for practical reasons the
computation required for such a high level of precision in
prediction would require far more information than any computer
could handle.

Still, the old model holds that the general laws

which determine our behavior are knowable, and that these laws
would allow fairly accurate predictions to be made from fairly
accurate data.

Newtonian determinism has hoped to at least come
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close to predicting behavior.
The Newtonian revolution made the world describable in
mathematical terms that seemingly eliminated the role of purpose
in the causation of events, preventing the possibility of free
will.

Likewise, by establishing the atomic theory as a

foundation of empirical science, Newton helped us redefine
ourselves as molecular people.

As a result of being defined in

purely physical terms, we are describable through Newtonian
determinism, which means our behavior is theoretically
understandable and predictable.

An example of this is given in

Mindwatching, a 1983 book by Hans J. and Michael Eysenck.

The

authors state, "What do psychologists hope to learn from their
study of behavior?

Ultimately, the goal is to understand why

people behave as they do, so that it will be possible to predict
and change their behavior" (1).

Proving predictability in human

behavior continues to be a major goal of science.
The problem, ho~ever, is that the sciences cannot claim that
this goal has been achieved.

The conclusion that we are governed

solely by physical laws would be aided considerably if this could
be done, but human beings stubbornly resist attempts to show that
our actions are knowable in advance.

This forces the

determinists into the embarrassing admission of unpredictability
in their model, which they excuse by saying that universal laws
of human behavior do exist but we do not yet have enough
information to establish them.

This unpredictability has been

seized upon by some as indirect evidence of the action of the
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contra-causal free will.
The difficulties with predictability are seen in one of the
strongest forms of scientific determinism, neurophysiological
determinism.

It has been described well by Ted Honderich.

The

strength of this particular brand of determinism lies in its
simplicity, since it can be described in three sentences.
"States of the brain are, in the first place, effects, the
effects of other physical states.

Many states of the brain,

secondly, are correlates [to mental states] . .

Some states

of the brain, thirdly, are causes, both of other states of the
brain and also of certain movement's of one's body" (187).
Looking at Honderich's description in reverse order, three
things should be observed.

First of all, Honderich's statement

that brain states determine our actions will not be contested.
Honderich is simply stating that the physical processes which
lead to our actions begin in the brain, and the evidence for this
is so overwhelming and intuitive that it will not even be
described.

This claim seems on the mark.

Secondly, Honderich does not insist that our mental states
are caused by the physical states of the brain, since it not
necessary to do so while still defending determinism.

Mental

events are a by-product, if that, to brain states in
neurophysiological determinism.

By not trying to explain mental

events, the deterministic argument is streamlined in that
psychologists do not have to be able to explain actions through
mental processes for determinism to be true.
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Thirdly, and most importantly, Honderich's statement that
brain states are determined by physical states is meant to
establish a deterministic way of explaining our behavior.
Nevertheless, he admits that causal laws showing how brain states
are caused by physical states are lacking.

"We do not know what

specific connexions hold between physical states and brain states
that are correlated with very specific higher mental events, such
events as noticing the date or speculating that America is a
plutocracy" (195).

Obviously, if physical laws have not been

established then prediction is impossible.
Since neurophysiological determinism cannot establish how
brain states are determined Honderich cannot rule out the
possibility of overdetermination, though he is "most
uncomfortable" with the prospect (197).

Overdetermination is the

thesis that while causal laws may work in the physical world,
physical processes can also be influenced by non-physical
entities such as free will.

overdetermination is important to

the free will argument and shall be examined further in the
context of that argument.
It has been seen that unpredictability untracks attempts to
complete the deterministic model, and this gives room for the
claim of free will.

If the determinists could show that causal

laws alone could explain this unpredictability, it would enhance
determinism and impair libertarianism.

Therefore, a successful

attempt to do so should be the criterion for judging the
effectiveness of chaos in improving the deterministic model.
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Having shown this, I shall turn to the libertarian argument.
The libertarian or free will argument advocates the
existence of a free will which acts as a first or uncaused cause
of our actions.

The libertarians agree with the hard

determinists in their critique of compatibilism; the soft
determinists are leading a false double life by believing that
freedom and causality are compatible.

Therefore, we need the

action of a free will to break the contradiction between freedom
and determinism, for the free will does not act out of efficient
causality.

Instead, it acts with final causality, or with

purpose.
The libertarians also differ with the compatibilists as to
the meaning of freedom.

The libertarians argue that the

compatibilists' "freedom from coercion" does not really fit our
traditional definition of freedom.

The libertarian

interpretation of freedom is seen in their analysis of the
sentence "I could have done otherwise."

The libertarians claim

that in order for an individual to really do otherwise, the
individual must have the ability to get beyond the binding laws
of universal causality.

It is only then that the individual has

"true" freedom.
As opposed to the compatibilist "freedom from coercion," the
libertarian version of freedom is known as ''freedom of
contingency."

Libertarian freedom is defined as freedom from

physical causality, not merely by the absence of intimidation
from others.

The libertarians do not make the distinction
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between conventional and ultimate truths that the determinists
do; accordingly, they argue that if we believe our actions to be
determined by causal laws, we are not free.
To avoid this problem, the libertarians propose the
existence of a free will which makes our actions contingent.
Actions may or may not happen, as opposed to having to happen,
which is the case in the deterministic model.

The libertarians

argue that this contingency is necessary for the statement "The
individual could have done otherwise" to agree with our
traditional definition of freedom.

Unlike compatibilism, this

definition of freedom allows us to believe others are truly
responsible for their actions, and that in turn presents a richer
picture of morality.
The ability of free will to produce this type of freedom is
described by Immanuel Kant, whose analysis of the debate I have
found somewhat useful in defining the libertarian argument.

"As

will is a kind of causality of living beings so far as they are
rational, freedom would be that property of this causality by
which it can be effective independent of foreign causes
determining it," (FMM 446) . 1

The intelligible character of free

will has a causality which ''is determining, not determined," thus
avoiding efficient causality and giving us true freedom (CPR

1

Abbreviation for Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
taken from Kant Selections.

Till 14
A556/B584). 2

The action of the free will is describable only in

terms of purpose, or final causality.
How the free will is capable of such a causality is not
explored in this paper.

Arguably, any attempts to answer such a

question are futile, for the free will cannot be directly
examined by science.

As a result, I will concentrate on showing

how free will may be possible and on proposing the ways in which
it may legitimately effect our behavior.

This mirrors the words

of Kant, who says "that nature does not contradict the causality
of freedom, was the only thing we could prove, or care to prove"
(CPR, A557/B586).

I will stick to developing a scientific

criterion for the strengthening of the libertarian argument, and
not go beyond that.
In attempting to establish the possibility of free will, the
libertarians are forced to critique the deterministic argument.
While determinism uses scientific evidence to develop its
philosophical arguments, libertarianism goes in the opposite
direction.

Libertarianism uses its philosophical belief that

freedom from causal laws is necessary for morality as a central
truth, and then looks for scientific reasons to allow for this
possibility.

As a result, it is necessary to attack the

deterministic belief in universal efficient causality to make
room for the possibility of free will.
The first move in accomplishing this is to assail the notion
2

Abbreviation for Critique of Pure Reason. All references
to this work are taken from Kant Selections, save one (pp. 15-16
of text).
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of ultimate truth, or at least our access to it, for the notion
that we have ultimate truths has already been shown to be harmful
to the libertarian argument.
this are open.

Two different routes to achieving

Immanuel Kant and Thomas Kuhn both provide

separate ways of damaging the argument that we have direct access
to ultimate truths.
Kant gives one answer to the question of universal efficient
causality that explains our seemingly instinctive belief in it as
an ultimate truth while allowing for the possibility of free
will.

Kant argues that causality is created by the mind to give

structure to our sensory experiences.

In this sense, efficient

causality is an ultimate truth, at least as far as we capable of
knowing; however, our senses are limited and we cannot experience
things-in-themselves (noumena), only our sensory images of them
(phenomena).

(Form and Principles, sect. II: 392) • 3

to ultimate truths is limited by our senses.

Our access

The limits upon our

sensory abilities presents the possibility that libertarian
freedom exists in the noumenal world but cannot be directly
experienced as a phenomenon.
While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical
conditions, the intelligible cause [the free will] together
with its causality, is outside the series.

Thus the effect

may be regarded as free in respect of intelligible cause,
and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting
3

Abbreviation for On the Form and Principles of the Sensible
and Intelligible World (The Inaugural Dissertation), taken from
Kant Selections.
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from them according to necessity (CPR, A537/B565) . 4
In this way, the appearance of the universality of efficient
causality can be maintained while in actuality freedom can exist.
Kant holds out the possibility of some ultimate truths which
we cannot directly access, and many modern philosophers of
science go even further by arguing that we cannot access ultimate
truths at all.

This has been asserted most strongly by the

influential philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, who argues that
there is no one way which we must see the world.

Instead, this

process is learned and we cannot say that the facts which we hold
as ultimately true are so at all, since the process by which we
experience the world is arbitrary.
Accordingly, Kuhn claims that scientific study is a form of
"puzzle solving," settling the questions encountered by any
paradigm, or set of arbitrary beliefs concerning reality (Kuhn,
234).

Paradigms are judged by their ability to solve the

internal puzzles that each must face.
By pushing what have been held as ultimate truths to the
level of conventional truths the contradiction between freedom
and determinism is revived, creating an unsolvable puzzle in our
deterministic paradigm.

The libertarians believe this

contradiction should make us alter our notion of causality.

In

particular, the libertarians argue that our paradigm should be

4

This quotation from the Critique of Pure Reason is taken
from Smith's translation. All other references to Kant are taken
from Kant Selections, which did not contain the segment quoted
here.
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changed to allow for something more than efficient causality;
namely, final causality, the kind that free will would fall
under.

Allowing such a causality would break the apparent

contradiction between free will and determinism.

The inability

of determinism to prove the free will ultimately false makes this
possible and necessary.
Also, libertarians argue that belief in the free will should
be adopted because it is more useful in effecting the actions of
others, which is the very purpose of conventional truths.

The

libertarians argue that their meaning of the word freedom best
fits our traditional use of that word, and compared to the more
limited compatibilist interpretation it provides a richer view of
morality.

For these reasons, the libertarians argue that its

existence should simply be presumed unless evidence shows
otherwise.
By attacking the notion of our access to ultimate truths,
Kant and Kuhn make some room for the libertarian argument.
However, to complete their argument, the libertarians need to
develop a model of their own which agrees with our experience of
the world.

It is here that the criteria for the improvement of

the argument will become clear.
Any attempt to define how the free will can and does act
must not contradict the beliefs that we have about the world,
whether those beliefs be ultimately or conventionally true.

A

model of the free will would be much more acceptable if it does
not directly challenge our experience of the world.

It also make
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the creation of such a model a much more difficult task.

Still,

all that the libertarians need to show is that possibility of
free will does not contradict our experience of the world, since
from this its existence can be "read" into our actions.
One way of establishing this is to attack the idea of
efficient causality, for the thesis of universal efficient
causation is not accepted universally.

Hume, for instance, was

harshly critical of the idea of efficient causality and Bertrand
Russell called for its abandonment altogether (Wright, 3).

The

reason for this is that we cannot actually "prove" or even sense
efficient causality - it is only a relation between events, where
the occurrence of the first event is thought to bring about the
second.

By criticizing the idea of efficient causality, the

possibility is opened that events are produced in other ways,
such as by overdetermination resulting from the action of the
free will.
However, at least the appearance of universal efficient
causality must be upheld, for it agrees with our experience of
the world.

As a result, the libertarian model must not consider

the action of the free will to be physically detectable.

The

world at least appears to be governed by causal laws, and since
the free will cannot be analyzed by science, physical indications
of the free will must not be available.

Such evidence would go

against our experience of the world and would be proof of the
free will, both of which seemingly are impossible.

Instead, if

the free will is to act, it can do so only where causality cannot
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predict behavior, since this would allow it to act without
detection.
The model of neurophysiological determinism is useful in
showing how this may be possible.

This model holds that our

behavior is determined by brain states, and that these brain
states are determined through causal laws.

However, no causal

laws have been yet established, and this provides the necessary
room for the libertarians to argue that brain states are
influenced not only by causal laws, but by the free will through
the process of overdetermination.
Accordingly, the deterministic belief that brain states are
theoretically predictable is harmful to the libertarians, for if
they are predictable it means that efficient causality alone
determines brain states and the free will is a vacuous doctrine.
As a result, for the possibility of overdetermination, our
seemingly deterministic and predictable world must at least
sometimes act in ways which are fundamentally unpredictable.

It

is only then that the free will can act, but the possibility of
this is all that is necessary for the libertarians to claim that
the existence of the free will should be presumed.
Fundamental unpredictability in brain states has been shown
to be necessary for the libertarian concept of overdetermination.
Showing that this is possible under our deterministic paradigm
has traditionally been a problem for the libertarians.

To

succeed in this task would greatly aid the libertarian argument.
A more specific and concrete account of how this
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overdetermination can take place is the problem to which I now
turn.
Attempts to develop a workable theory of overdetermination
date back to the ancient Greeks.

In particular, the writings of

the Epicurean philosopher Lucretius are informative in this
regard.

The Epicureans believed in an atomic theory slightly

similar to the one we hold today.

In particular, they believed

that everything consisted of atoms which were smaller than the
eye could see, and were generally governed by universal laws.
Lucretius allowed for the ability of the free will to cause these
atoms to randomly "swerve" in a manner that cannot be perceived,
thereby altering what would have otherwise happened while not
overtly breaking the laws of causality.
For this we see to be manifest and plain, that weights, as
far as in them lies, cannot travel obliquely, as far as one
can perceive; but who is there that can perceive that they
never swerve ever so little from the straight undeviating
course?
Again, if all motion is always one long chain, and new
motion arises out of the old in order invariable, and if the
first-beginnings do not make by swerving a beginning of
motion such as to break the decrees of fate, that cause may
not follow cause from infinity, whence comes this free will
in living creatures all over the earth, whence I say is this
will wrestled from the fates by which we proceed whither
pleasure leads each, swerving also our motions not at fixed
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times and fixed places, but just where our mind has taken
us?

For undoubtedly it is his own will in each that begins

these things, and from the will movements go rippling
through the limbs (lines 247-264).
This ability of the free will to change the course of the
atoms is a statement of overdetermination.

The free will works

at an undetectable level to effect a large-scale change in what
would have otherwise happened had only the laws of causality been
in effect.

This Epicurean Swerve can only be done if some

deterministic events are fundamentally unpredictable, since the
free will could then act without breaking the appearance of
physical causality.

Several endeavors have been made to develop

a modern-day Epicurean Swerve, and they provide additional
insight into the construction of the libertarian model.
These attempts have relied upon some of the cracks in the
pillars of predictable Newtonian science which have developed
this century.

In particular, the Heisenburg Uncertainty

Principle has been unsettling to classical determinism and it has
been used by some to justify free will.

The Uncertainty

Principle states that the action of individual particles at the
subatomic level is indeterminant: the fundamental limits on our
ability to gather information at this level means we simply
cannot tell whether or not causal laws apply here. (Crutchfield
et al., 48).
For instance, George Prescott Scott attempts to show that
the free will could act at the quantum level to affect brain
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states in Atoms of the Living Flame.

Scott argued that neurons

are subject to the influence of quantum indeterminacy, meaning
that brain states are themselves indeterminant.

Thus, universal

efficient causality is avoided and the possibility of free will
is open (318).

John Thorp makes a similar case in Free Will: A

Defence Against Neurophysiological Determinism, relying upon
indeterminacy in the firing of individual neurons in the brain
(71) •

Relying upon the Indeterminacy Thesis to establish the
possibility of free will has two problems.
might be wrong.

First of all, it

Einstein was outspoken in his criticism of it,

declaring that "God does not play dice!'' (Pojmon, 408).

The

discovery of subatomic events is still fairly recent, and
advances in physics could show that subatomic events are just as
deterministic as those at the atomic level.

Still, indeterminacy

does seem to be real, since limits upon what we can learn at this
level do seem to be fundamental.
Secondly, the effects of indeterminacy seem to be limited to
the subatomic world.

Indeterminant events at the subatomic level

balance out to allow classical Newtonian physics to operate
without disturbance (Pool, 893).

This is particularly damaging

to Scott's argument, which holds that subatomic events can
influence behavior.

By the same token, indeterminacy in the

firing of brain cells can be expected to statistically balance
out in the whole.

Universal causality is maintained, and brain

states are still thought of as theoretically understandable and
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even predictable.

For this reason, Thorp's argument based upon

indeterminacy in brain neurons does not seem to be enough to
escape universal causality.
Scott and Thorp fail in their arguments because the
unpredictability they establish is not enough to significantly
alter brain states.

What is needed for the possibility of free

will is a mechanism which could amplify this indeterminacy into
having a substantial effect upon brain states, or could act by
itself to produce unpredictability in brain states.

Doing so

could allow for the undetectable influence of the free will to
have an effect on our behavior.

This is the purpose of

overdetermination or the Epicurean Swerve.
The importance of demonstrating that something like an
Epicurean Swerve is possible is shown in that it would allow an
explanation of how the free will may effect our actions.
Especially useful in sketching out this explanation is a recent
investigation conducted by Dr. Benjamin Libet of the University
of California at San Francisco.
Libet's experiments on voluntary action indicate that the
brain may unconsciously develop options for action but that these
potential actions must pass through an individual's consciousness
before the action can take place.

Libet theorizes that the free

will acts during this brief interlude with veto power over
inclinations to act, stopping some potential actions while
allowing the realization of others (529).
develop ideas, it simply chooses from them.

The free will does not
This answers a
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possible objection that somehow the free will works upon the mind
to create potentials for action, which is full of theoretical
difficulties.
Instead, the Epicurean Swerve would be used to alter brain
states, randomly scattering vetoed potential actions into
oblivion.

This works just as effectively as the idea of a free

will which directs brain states, and also means that the free
will could act without being detected.

Additionally, it explains

why all animals can have free will but only humans can have
morality, since we are the only ones who can develop the idea of
it.
As the discussion hopefully shows, a way of showing that a
world seemingly governed by efficient causality can allow for
fundamental unpredictability is essential for the libertarian
argument.

This would open the possibility that the free will can

exist, and the libertarians claim that if it is possible then its
existence should be presumed.

Accomplishing this will be the

criterion for the advancing of the libertarian argument, which I
will try to show that chaos meets.
Similarly, the determinists must show that causal laws alone
can explain the unpredictability of behavior.

By doing so, the

determinists can malign the libertarian belief that
unpredictability of behavior results from the action of the
mysterious free will.

These criteria are closely related, if not

identical, and it should not be surprising to find that the
meeting of one criterion simultaneously meets the other.

This
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should be kept in mind as I turn to a review of chaos, where the
theoretical groundwork for meeting these criteria will be set
down.
III.

Chaos

As mentioned already, chaos is the name used to describe
deterministic systems which display apparently random behavior.
Chaos also indicates that some seemingly random behavior is more
explainable than once thought.

Chaos applies to the same

physical systems that Newton dealt with in establishing the
modern deterministic model, and so would seem to have some
theoretical relevance to the larger philosophical discussion.
This section will review the science of chaos to establish
how it may theoretically meet the criteria established in the
last section and to show how chaos can be detected in our
behavior.

More specifically, I will attempt to show in this

section that chaos works as a double-edged sword in the
philosophical debate, for it can theoretically be used to back
the criterion established for both arguments.

The ways in which

it does so are outlined in the first part of this section, which
reviews chaos and the way it is generated by deterministic
systems.
Attempts to substantiate the theoretical conclusions drawn
at the end of the first part of the section take up the rest of
the paper, beginning with the second half of this section, which
reviews the specific ways in which a chaotic system can be
identified.

The importance of identifying chaotic systems will
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be seen in the next section, which makes a more concrete attempt
to show that chaos applies to our understanding of behavior.

It

is from this information that the final conclusions will be
drawn.
This half of the section will establish how chaos comes
about and show the theoretical ways in which it encounters the
free will and determinism debate.

Chaos shares with that debate

an indebtedness to the work of Newton as a foundation for its
arguments.

Newton tried to show that nature is describable in

purely physical ways.

He dissected nature into closed systems

which could be analyzed independently of each other.
Specifically, these systems of motion (and equilibrium states)
are referred to as dynamical systems, and they are mathematically
describable through differential equations.

Differential

equations are used to deduce future states of a dynamical system
(Ekeland, 21).
Newton attempted to describe nature solely through linear
differential equations, which are solvable and predictable.

A

linear equation is one in which any two solutions added together
is itself a solution (Stewart, 81).

Linear equations can be

displayed on a graph as a straight line or smooth curve, and
allow for predictions to be made.

For instance, by knowing the

position and momentum of two objects, it is easy to predict where
they will go, or if two objects are about to collide, their new
directions and speeds are predictable.
Even now, the world is often thought to be describable
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through linear equations and events believed to be theoretically
predictable, so great is the influence of Newton.

However, this

deterministic assumption is being shown to be wildly off the
mark, for non-linear equations play a large role in describing
nature.

Non-linear equations have terms which are multiplied by

themselves.

When displayed on a graph, non-linear equations take

on much more violent shapes than their linear counterparts.

.
the

non-linear equations are unsolvable, and because of this

Many

actions of even simple deterministic systems are unpredictable.

.

/

For example, the French mathematician Henri Poincare showed
at the turn of this century that when three or more bodies are
acting upon each other at the same time, the differential
equation for that system becomes formally unsolvable due to the
non-linearity of the equation (Ekeland, 36).

This unsolvable

system is known as the "three-body problem."

Establishing non-

linearity at such a simple level shows that linear equations do
not alone best model nature, and implies that the world is
unpredictable to a significant extent.

The unpredictability

created by many non-linear systems is chaos.
This unpredictability is produced through a process of
feedback.

In a linear system, errors are magnified

arithmetically and do not make a large dent in the accuracy of
predictions.

Non-linear systems, on the other hand, amplify

errors geometrically, since nonlinear equations have terms which
multiply themselves.

Errors are fed back into the equation so

that they produce even greater errors down the line.

It is this
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feedback which causes chaotic systems to act unpredictably.
Small errors in initial conditions rapidly "blow up," making
prediction impossible.
A striking model of this can be seen within the classical
model of billiards.

Disregarding the supposedly negligible non-

linear effects of friction and gravity, the action of the
billiard balls is considered to be a closed system and perfectly
predictable under Newtonian laws.

However, when the supposedly

negligible effects of non-linear variables are included in the
equation, the paths of the billiard balls quickly becomes
unworkable.

Unless the gravitational pull of electrons at the

edge of the galaxy is included in the equation, the path of the
balls is impossible to predict after just one minute!
(Crutchfield et al., 49).
In this example, chaos makes its appearance in two ways.
First of all, the attempt to approximate a non-linear equation
introduced errors into the setting up of the equations itself.
Secondly, the inability to gather infinitely correct data for the
equations introduced small errors into the computation of
results.

One such incorrect datum is the roundness of the

billiard balls, as determined by pi.

Calculation of the balls'

roundness are only approximations since the complete value of pi
cannot be determined (Crutchfield et al., 49).

Chaos takes these

infinitesimally small errors and rapidly magnifies them,
destroying predictability.
The infinite sensitivity to errors in chaotic systems makes
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predictability a hopeless task.

This is a major break with the

traditional Newtonian model, which held that fairly accurate
predictions would result from fairly accurate data, and has
forced a reexamination of the deterministic model.

G.M.K. Hunt

has designed a useful dichotomy to show the effects of chaos upon
this model.

In particular, he notes the subdivision of

epistemically deterministic, or predictable, systems from the
whole of physically deterministic systems (132).

Though they had

once been considered one and the same, the science of chaos
demands their separation.
Furthermore, epistemically deterministic systems seem to be
the exception rather than the rule, for chaos has been theorized
to play a role in the paths of the planets and has been
documented in the unpredictable path of Saturn's moon Hyperion
(Hartley, 39; "First," 998).

At the other end of the spectrum,

chaos has been seen at the subatomic level, hinting that such
processes are governed by deterministic means after all
(Gutzwiller, 78).

In between, chaos even has been demonstrated

in the dripping of a faucet (Crutchfield et al., 55).

Chaos

implies unpredictability from the most basic levels of our
physical world to the largest.

It is also suggestive that chaos

exists in the physical processes which determine our behavior.
Along with quantum indeterminacy, chaos provides a second
blow to the perfectly predictable world envisioned by LaPlace,
but the impact of chaos is on a much greater scale.

The universe

appears to have many unpredictable secrets which can never be

Till 30
known because of chaos.

Having established this, some

theoretical answers to the free will and determinism debate can
be drawn.
By showing that unpredictability is intrinsic to
determinism, chaos answers the criterion that determinism explain
unpredictability.

Behavior that had previously been viewed as

unpredictable due to a lack of knowledge can now be modelled
through deterministic means.

If chaos plays a role in our

understanding of behavior then we may will finally be able to
model the unpredictability of our behavior in a deterministic
way.

We will no longer have to resort to a shrug and a wishy-

washy statement that Newtonian determinism will be able to
explain behavior "someday."
Furthermore, the ability to better explain behavior in a
deterministic fashion hurts the libertarian model.

Chaos exists

in systems which are deterministic, and determinism does not
allow for free will.

By showing that unpredictability can result

through causal laws, the libertarian argument that determinism
cannot explain our behavior is lost.

The role of chaos in our

understanding of behavior is of obvious interest to the
determinists, then, and will be explored in the next section.
At the same time, chaos could aid the libertarian argument
by providing the fundamental unpredictability necessary for the
free will to act without detection.

It could do so in one or two

ways.
First, the infinite sensitivity to errors in data could
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enable chaos to be the mechanism to amplify the apparent
indeterminacy in the brain.

It will be recalled that this

mechanism is necessary for overdetermination to take place.
"Quantum mechanics implies that initial measurements are always
uncertain, and chaos ensures that the uncertainties will quickly
overwhelm the ability to make predictions" (Crutchfield, et al.,
49).

Chaos could operate as the tool by which the free will

impacts brain states.
Second, even without quantum indeterminacy, chaos may be
able to create the required unpredictability in brain states.

If

chaos exists in the brain, the determination of brain states as a
whole could be fundamentally unpredictable.

By showing that

chaos can affect the brain states which determine behavior, the
possibility of free will is opened.

Furthermore, the infinite

sensitivity to input that is characteristic of chaos could be
used by the free will to alter brain states.

The free will could

act at a level beyond our ability to analyze and use chaos to
expand this initial input.
Dr. Libet's study on the role of conscious will in voluntary
action is useful in showing how chaos may be used by the free
will to effect our actions.

Libet's study indicated that

although our initiatives to act begin unconsciously, we do have
the ability to block these initiatives.

The free will could use

chaos to randomly scatter vetoed potentials for action through
overdetermination, acting without detection.
libertarian or contingent freedom.

This would give us

And of course, the
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libertarians argue that if the free will is possible it should be
presumed to exist.
Attempts to prove these theoretical conclusions take up the
rest of the paper.

In the remainder of this section, a few tools

with which chaotic systems can be identified are given.

These

tools will be useful in establishing the role of chaos in
behavior, which will be shown in the next section.
While chaos shows that even simple deterministic systems can
act in complex and unpredictable ways, it also provides science
with the ability to explain seemingly random behavior in simple
ways.

The key to this is that chaos is marked by periods of near

order intermeshed with times of apparent randomness. (Briggs,
62).

This separates it from truly random behavior, in which no

order is found.
An example of this is the weather, the first system shown to
be chaotic, as done by meteorologist Edward Lorenz in 1961
(Gleick, 31).

While the behavior of the weather never repeats,

there is order to what is encountered.

Certain atmospheric

conditions often nearly repeat, and this allows for some degree
of prediction.

Even when the weather turns violent, it

eventually comes back to some sort of stable state, showing how
order and randomness are woven together within chaos.

However,

long-term predictions are often nothing more than intuition, and
even short-term predictions can be terribly wrong.
Identifying a chaotic system is usually not as easy as this
description might make it sound to be.

Often, the output of a
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system simply appears random, as opposed to chaotic.

Random

systems can be described linearly, and remain theoretically
predictable.

The only difficulty in predicting a random system

is the large number of variables that have to be included in the
equation.

The dripping of a faucet exemplifies the difficulties

in telling the two systems apart.

The dripping of a faucet often

appears to be random, but actually is chaotic; that is, there is
an underlying order behind the appearance of randomness.
Fortunately, there is a empirical way of identifying chaotic
systems.
This method views the output of a system in what is known as
phase space.

Again, the work of Newton was instrumental in the

development of this dynamical tool.

Phase space consists of six

dimensions; three for the position of an object, three for its
momentum (Gutzwiller, 80).

Phase space best shows the tendency

of chaotic systems to settle down into periods of relative order.
Chaotic systems leave a distinguishing signature - a thumbprint,
in a sense - in diagrams of phase space, known as a chaotic
attractor (Gleick, 140).

Chaotic systems differ from linear

systems in phase space in that their identifying attractors are
much more contorted than those of linear systems.

Also, chaotic

attractors carry a self-similarity to infinite levels of
magnification.

This self-similar shape is known as a fractal,

and is produced in phase space only by chaotic systems (Briggs,
168).

The tendency of chaotic systems to act with varying degrees
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of near order and apparent randomness, combined with the ability
to establish chaotic attractors, give two ways of identifying
chaos.

These will be of some use in the next section, which will

provide the material necessary to bridge the river between the
theoretical conclusions sketched out in this section and their
actual relevance to human behavior.
IV.

Evidence of Chaos in Behavior

The mathematical model of chaos has shown the weaknesses of
the predictable, deterministic model envisioned by Laplace, which
our behavior is still largely modeled by.

Nevertheless, this

does not necessarily mean that chaos plays a role in our
understanding of behavior.

It is a big jump to connect our

behavior to the mathematical model of chaos, and if there is a
link between the two, it must be established.
Even if chaos does work here, it may be limited in scope and
allow our behavior to still be theoretically predictable.

This

section will attempt to back up the theoretical conclusions of
the last section by searching for evidence as to what role chaos
plays in our understanding of behavior.

This will allow final

conclusions to be drawn in the next section.
Evidence of chaos in behavior will be sought at two levels.
Chaos in the action of individuals within groups, or chaos in
social systems, will be referred to as the macroscopic study of
chaos in behavior.

At the other end of the spectrum, at the

microscopic level, the role of chaos in the determination of
brain states that cause our behavior will be examined.

The role
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that chaos can be expected to play at both of these levels can be
seen by reviewing the model of chaotic billiards.
At the macroscopic leve1, the action of the billiard balls
can be compared to the action of groups of individuals.

As that

model shows, even the smallest of errors in quantification leads
to inaccurate predictions, even though the laws that govern the
action of the balls are known.

The path of even one ball cannot

be predicted without knowing the potential behavior of everything
which may act upon it, which is impossible in a chaotic system.
In social systems, which are less quantifiable and more
complex than a simple billiards table, the problem is only
magnified.

Even if the laws by which our behavior are guided by

are known, small errors in quantifying the data to solve for
these equations would explode and cause unpredictability.

The

role of chaos indicates that the prediction of our behavior is
theoretically impossible and that only possible trends and
tendencies can be identified.
How do the macroscopic studies fit into the theoretical
conclusions of the last section?

By establishing chaos at the

macroscopic level, unpredictability could be explained entirely
through causal laws.

This would aid the determinists by giving a

deterministic explanation to what previously could not be
explained causally.

On the other hand, this unpredictability

does not seem to significantly aid the libertarians because it is
limited to the action of groups.

Macroscopic unpredictability

does not seem to give the individual freedom of contingency since
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it exists only at the level of the group and does not seem to
extend to the fundamental level of brain states, where the
processes which determine an individual's behavior take place.
The macroscopic study of behavior would aid the determinists
more than the libertarians, but microscopic studies of chaos in
brain states provide another way of explaining unpredictability
in behavior that is more beneficial to the libertarian cause.

If

chaos works in the brain, it may make the brain states which
determine behavior as unpredictable as the chaotic billiard
table.

In so doing, it could push unpredictability of behavior

to the most fundamental levels that science could hope to
examine.
This would provide exactly the kind of fundamental
unpredictability in the brain that the libertarians seek to allow
for the possibility of overdetermination, and would represent a
substantial improvement in their model.

At the same time,

however, the determinists would also be helped by providing them
with another causal explanation to unpredictable behavior.
Having established the general ways that chaos may act at
each of the two levels and the importance of each, evidence of
chaos can now be cited.

I will begin with the macroscopic

studies, where some work has been done linking chaos and our
behavior.

For instance, David Loye and Riane Eisler of the

Institute for Futures Forecasting in Carmel, California, note
that chaos may fit the goals of general systems theory and
appears to be a transdisciplinary tool which can be applied to
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social systems (55).
Evidence of the transdisciplinary nature of chaos is seen in
the headway that it has made in economic theory, foreign policy,
and even literature, among other fields of study (Rosser, 268;
Murray et al., 1869; Hayles, 305).

It also hints that chaos can

be applied to the microscopic discipline of neurobiological
determinism, which will be dealt with a little later.
The likely existence of chaos in social systems has been
noticed by many scientists, who argue that it presents an
absolute barrier to prediction.

The extent of the problem is

summed up by Ian Stewart in Does God Play Dice?, as he quotes a
previous statement he made in conjunction with Tim Poston.
Noting Poincare's work on the impossibility of the three-body
problem, Stewart writ~s, "So the 'inexorable laws of physics' on
which - for instance - Marx tried to model his laws of history,
were never really there.

If Newton could not predict the

behaviour of three balls, how could Marx predict that of three
people?" (40) . 5
Other scientists make similar pronouncements.

Herbert A.

Simon of Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh bluntly states
that chaos means that "we must give up prediction as the primary
goal of modeling" within social systems (Simon, 8).

Also, Dr.

Hendon Chubb, Director of the Brief Therapy Institute in West
Cornwall, Connecticut, spells out his belief that control of
5

Stewart quotes himself and Poston from Analog, Nov. 1981.
Since he is quoting himself, I have not included Analog in the
list of works cited.
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behavior is impossible because of the chaotic nature of social
systems.

Unfortunately, he provides no empirical evidence to

back this up, except for the unstated evidence that therapists
are not now able to predict behavior with reliability {Chubb,
174) .

More substantial proof of unpredictability comes from a
study undertaken by Dr. Diana Richards of Yale University.

As an

indication of how recent a discovery chaos is, Dr. Richards
points to her 1990 study as the first empirical and experimental
examination of how well chaos works as a model in the social
sciences (Richards, 213).

The study analyzed the interdependent

decision making habits of individuals, where the decision of one
individual can affect the decision of another.

The sample size

was small, as only eight subjects were involved in the study.
Nonetheless, of these eight, six exhibited behavior that was
described as chaotic in an experimental test known as the
prisoner's dilemma (Richards, 232).

Because these actions are

chaotic, the results of Dr. Richard's study mirror the conclusion
of Dr. Chubb that behavior is unpredictable.
The examples cited above are indicative of the small but
growing theoretical and experimental evidence showing that chaos
works to prevent the predictability of behavior at the
macroscopic level.

The evidence also backs up the tentative

conclusions mentioned earlier that it advances the determinist
argument while not doing so with the libertarian.
However, there is another way of explaining how chaos may
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create unpredictability in behavior, and that is by looking to
the microscopic studies of chaos in the determination of the
brain states which cause our behavior.

The link between chaos

and behavior is more difficult to establish here, since there is
no model yet that gives a thorough description of the workings of
the brain.
Nonetheless, recent research into the role of chaos promises
to expand our general understanding of what we do know about the
brain, and shows that chaos seems to play a role in the
determination of behavior.

To establish this, the role of chaos

in brain states will be traced from the most general hints of its
existence in the brain to more specific explanations of how it
works there.
One concrete indication that chaos exists in the brain is
that the normal pattern of electrical behavior in the brain
appears to be chaotic (Taubes, 65).

This means that there is a

hidden order in data that had been perceived to be random "noise"
(Skarda and Freeman, 165)

Furthermore, the failure of the brain

waves to remain consistently chaotic has severe consequences,
since evidence suggests that electrical patterns become regular
during epileptic seizures (Skarda and Freeman, 189).

This

mirrors evidence which shows that the heartbeat is normally
chaotic, and that heart attacks are often preceded by a regular
heartbeat (Goldberger, 47).
Another indication of chaos in the brain comes from Arnold
Mandell, a San Diego psychiatrist and dynamicist who claims to
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have uncovered chaos in the action of chemicals in the brain
(Gleick, 298).

Mandell argues that this is but a part of the

larger impact of chaos in our lives, which could extend even to
our personalities, a claim that will be dealt with later in this
section (Briggs, 168).
The likely existence of chaos in the brain causes the task
to turn to discovering what role it plays in the determination of
our actions.

Some interesting work in this direction comes from

physicist Gottfried Mayer-Kress and his students at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory's Center for Nonlinear Studies.

They

have developed a mathematical model of how changes in brain
patterns are related to changes in behavior (Alper, 21).

Their

work shows a link between the two, and importantly, that the
changes in brain patterns take place chaotically.

Because the

patterns are chaotic, this is evidence that the behavioral states
they correspond to are unpredictable.

However, the study does

not show if chaos actually helps determine future behavioral
states or if it is merely a by-product of the brain's activity.
Research to prove the former will now be given.
One indication that chaos is intrinsic to the operation of
the brain is given by Ors. Don Walter and Alan Garfinkel of
University of California at Los Angeles.

They devised a model

which linked three neurons together and found that the neurons
acted chaotically (Briggs, 167).
daunting.

The implications of this are

The average brain consists of 10 11 neurons, with 10 4

synapses each, for a total of 10 15 connections.

This is roughly

Till 41

equal to the number of stars in the Milky Way Galaxy, and the
connections are different with every person (Bridgemann, 57).

If

chaos exists here, predictability of brain states would seem to
be a staggering impossibility.
Still, this is just a simple computer model, and it only
gives the most general of information concerning the role of
chaos in the brain.

More informative studies on how chaos

operates in the brain have been done by neurophysiologists Walter
J. Freeman of the University of California at Berkeley and

Christine A. Skarda of the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris.

They

have developed a theory of how the brain generates and uses
chaos, and this makes their work important to any discussion of
how chaos may effect the brain states which determine our
actions.
Skarda and Freeman claim that the chaos is essential to the
functioning of the brain.

They discovered evidence indicating

that chaos plays an important role in the way information is
transmitted, stored, and recalled by the brain.

Freeman suggests

that the brain uses chaos to generate insight and creativity, and
is necessary in the determination of our consciousness.

By

demonstrating that chaos may deeply permeate the way that the
brain works, Skarda and Freeman show that chaos is critical to
the creation of the brain states which bring about our actions.
In doing so, this also indicates that chaos plays an important
role in making these brain states unpredictable.
Skarda and Freeman focused their work on the function of
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perception.

In particular, their studies concentrated on the

olfactory system of rabbits.

They analyzed this system because

it is one of the brain's most well-understood systems (Skarda and
Freeman, 162).

Importantly, they note that they have discovered

chaos not only in this system but throughout the brain.

As a

result, Freeman believes that lessons gained from the study of
the olfactory system are applicable to other parts of the brain
(Freeman, 85), and so their work will be given special treatment.
The researchers understood that even a small input from
scents detected by neurons in the nasal passages could have a
dramatic effect on the output of brain waves in the olfactory
system, and they recognized this output to be chaotic.

"Chaos is

evident in the tendency of vast collections of neurons to shift
abruptly and simultaneously from one complex activity pattern to
another in response to the smallest of inputs" (Freeman, 78).
Skarda and Freeman believe that this chaos arises through a
process of feedback (Skarda and Freeman, 171).

Freeman argues

that chaos can arise in the brain when two or more of its parts
are communicating with one another over the same input signal but
cannot agree on a common message between them (Freeman, 85).
This causes the neurons in each part to become more excited and
leads to further communication between the two halves.

This

process of feedback is characteristic of chaos.
Evidence for feedback is seen in that the chaos in the
olfactory system stopped when the two parts of the system were
experimentally disconnected by the researchers (Freeman, 85).
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Furthermore, other researchers have established this kind of
feedback between parts of the brain used in memory (Miskin and
Appenzeller, 85).

The discovery that feedback between parts of

the brain leads to chaos is noteworthy because decision-making
involves many parts of the brain (Bridgemann, 415; Cami, 277).
This suggests that the brain states which determine our actions
are themselves chaotic.
Furthermore, the brain seems designed to have a constant
amount of chaos operating within it.

In the olfactory system,

the original signal from the nasal neurons is muted to remove
unnecessary information as it moves between the two parts,
meaning that each gets a different message.

This insures

disagreement over the message, generating chaos, while at the
same time keeping chaos within certain broad boundaries (Skarda
and Freeman, 168).

Failure to keep chaos under control may cause

the brain to force itself into a regular pattern of electrical
activity - possibly leading to an epileptic seizure (Skarda and
Freeman, 168).

The ability to explain brain events outside of

the sense of smell furthers Freeman's claim that chaos exists
throughout the brain.
Other research which took place after Skarda and Freeman
published their work has shown that it is possible to control a
chaotic system in this way if the control is constantly pursued
(Peterson, 60).

Furthermore, the researchers who took part in

this independent research claim that controlled chaos appears to
be a "necessary ingredient" to the operation of the brain
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(Peterson, 61}.

This separate research adds weight to the claims

of Skarda and Freeman and shows that chaos may play a role in the
creation of brain states which determine behavior.
Further evidence of the chaotic nature of brain waves is
shown by the researchers' ability to display their data of brain
waves in the form of a chaotic attractor.

In the olfactory

system, this attractor develops when the miscommunication between
parts of the system begins to settle down after it is held under
the influence of a scent for a short time (Freeman, 84).

It will

be recalled from the previous section that chaotic systems do
tend to settle down into periods of relative order.

Again, this

is strong evidence that chaos does influence brain states.
Each chaotic attractor represents the firing of particular
groups of neurons in the olfactory system and its shape changed
with each new scent that the olfactory system was exposed to
(Freeman, 84).

The fact that a chaotic attractor has been

uncovered is highly indicative that the brain uses chaos to help
make sense of the data it receives (Skarda and Freeman, 168).

In

playing a determining role in the process of perception, chaos
influences the data upon which our decisions are based.
The researchers theorize that this chaotic attractor plays a
role in how the brain learns, as well.

Chaotic attractors

represent the pattern of the firing of particular groups of
neurons.

When a scent causes a particular group of neurons to

fire, the connections between the neurons which represent the
attractor are strengthened, and they begin to work as one in what
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the researchers refer to as a nerve cell assembly.

These nerve

cell assemblies are essential to the way that scents are learned
by the olfactory system (Skarda and Freeman, 168).

When a scent

is detected and the olfactory system is alerted, these nerve cell
assemblies allow instant recognition of familiar scents (Freeman,
68).

In this way, chaos plays a role in how the brain makes

interprets the information the senses present it and determines
how this information is stored.
This is apparent from reading Skarda and Freeman, but
perhaps a more convincing source is Bruce Bridgemann, a
neurobiologist from the University of Bielfeld, Germany, who
seems to have been unaware of the work of the two researchers on
chaos and the brain.

In Bridgemann's attempt to describe the way

neurons link up, he states that "the determination of a
biological nerve network is not deterministic, but neither is it
random.

Rather, it seems to be a kind of messy, flexible

determinism, governed by organizing principles but not completely
specified by them" (Bridgemann, 402).

This description agrees

with how a chaotically determined system might appear to an
uninitiated observer.
Furthermore, the chaotic attractors representing different
nerve cell assemblies all change when a unique scent is .detected
by the olfactory system for the first time.

The evidence that

these "memory maps" are capable of changing agrees with the
ability of stroke patients to relearn functions that previously
had been located in the damaged areas of the brain.

Chaos makes
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the brain states which determine our behavior unpredictable by
influencing the way that the information necessary for decisions
is sensed and learned.
Importantly, the power of chaos in the brain is not limited
to merely our interpretation of the external world but helps us
look inward as well, since Freeman also suggests that chaos may
be the key to our creativity.

He notes that chaos is constantly

able to produce new activity patterns, and the harnessing of this
by the brain would allow for ingenuity and imagination (Freeman,
85).

The ability of the brain to develop unique thoughts is

critical for decision-making and behavior, and chaos may give us
the ability to do this.
Freeman goes as far as to say that our consciousness itself
may be the result of these chaotic processes (85), echoing the
words of Mandell that chaos may create our personalities.

If so,

chaos gives an explanation for the fact that while our behavior
may be unpredictable, we act with enough order that we can define
individual character traits.

The combination of unpredictability

and order is seen in all chaotic systems.

Indeed, if chaos is

essential in giving rise to our consciousness, then it can play a
role in determining our actions.

To quote psychologist David

Oakley, "Consciousness can be involved in the control of behavior
at the level of the individual action and at the more molar level
of the plan" (Oakley, 69).
The evidence shows that chaos could play a role in the
determination of our actions, which means that those actions and
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the brain states which determine them are unpredictable.

Chaos

has been seen in the way in which we make sense of the world and
in how tpis information is stored, and has been suggested as the
source of our creativity and consciousness.

Decision-making is a

process which requires all of these functions.

Chaos in any of

these functions would probably make prediction impossible, so
this thoroughly chaotic theory of the brain suggests enormous
unpredictable complexity in the physical processes which
determine our behavior.
Taken together, the macroscopic and microscopic studies seem
to indicate that our behavior is steeped in chaos.

It shows that

our actions may be fundamentally unpredictable but also suggests
that this unpredictability arises through a deterministic
process.

In so doing, this section provides evidence to back up

the claims made earlier about how chaos may be used to back both
the deterministic and libertarian arguments.

A more thorough

discussion of this is now forthcoming.
V.

Conclusions

The evidence given in the preceding section indicates that
chaos plays a role in behavior at both the macroscopic and
microscopic levels.

The existence of chaos in behavior allows

conclusions to be drawn which I believe endorse the purpose of
this paper, which was to "demonstrate that while chaos improves
the case for determinism, it also shows that free will might be
possible in a world that otherwise appears to be governed by
universal efficient causality."

The criteria established earlier
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will now be brought into play to establish my final conclusions
for both the deterministic and libertarian arguments.
The criterion for advancing determinism, it will be
recalled, was to develop an explanation for the unpredictability
that we see in behavior.

Previously, such unpredictability was

claimed to be due simply to a lack of knowledge about behavior,
but this left open to the libertarians the possibility that
behavior is unpredictable because of free will.

The role of

chaos in establishing unpredictability as part of determinism
holds the key to fulfilling this criterion and providing a basis
for rejecting the libertarian claim.
Chaos explains the unpredictability of behavior in a
thoroughly deterministic fashion.

The separation of epistemic

determinism from physical determinism demands that unpredictable
events will occur.

Theoretically, this assists determinism in

that by showing that unpredictable events can take place within
that model, eliminating the need for a free will.

These

theoretical conclusions are supported by the evidence which shows
that chaos is not just a mathematical model but one that actually
can be applied to our behavior.
The evidence of chaos at the macroscopic level alone is
enough to prove the criterion for determinism.

Chaos at the

level of social systems implies that behavior is unpredictable,
thus repelling the challenge of the libertarians.

The evidence

of chaos at the microscopic level goes even further and shows
that a new understanding of the deterministic brain may be called
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for.
The chaos-laden workings of the brain shows that chaos plays
many roles in the determination of our actions.

Chaos effects

the way that we unconsciously see the world and what information
we draw from it.

It may also give the brain the ability to look

ahead to see the consequences of particular actions and to learn
from those mental trial-and-error patterns.

Chaos may even

provide us with the consciousness necessary for decision-making.
Chaos provides determinism with a new way of viewing
unpredictability that previously it could not explain.
Even the libertarian claim based upon indeterminacy is
attacked, because chaos seems to exist at the quantum level,
hinting that the indeterminant events which take place at that
level are in fact determined.

All this evidence is useful for

the deterministic argument, but in particular I believe it is
especially strengthens the compatibilist argument.

The

philosophical impact of chaos on determinism can now be outlined.
First, chaos implies that we have no knowable fate.

In this

sense, we are free, since the decisions we make and the reasons
for those decisions are our own.

No one can entirely predict our

actions, and no one can ever have absolute control over us.
There are no Shakespearian witches with the power to see into the
future and against whose prophesies we vainly struggle in
attempts to change inevitable fate.

Because of the difficulties

with prediction of behavior, our future remains in some sense
"open," as it forever hidden from us.

Till 50
Second, if my actions are not ultimately free, the chaosladen image of the brain shows that the reasons for this are so
far removed from my life that they cease to be relevant.

The

microscopic studies of the brain show that even if our behavior
is determined entirely by efficient causality, this process is so
remarkably complex and unpredictable that it seems impossible for
anyone to get to the bottom of it.

If the truth is that we are

governed by mechanical laws, I can live with and still believe
myself free.
This is a central tenet of compatibilism, as mentioned
earlier.

Causality is not a category that applies to immediate

experience and the chaotic model of determinism makes causality
an even more difficult tiger to take by the tail, for even when
causal laws can be established, it does not follow that
predictability will result.

The link between cause and effect

can only be determined in retrospect, if then.

Arguably, this

destroys the contradiction between determinism and freedom and
deflates much criticism of the compatibilist argument.
Chaos strengthens determinism by showing that the
unpredictability of behavior is not a failure o{ the model but is
rather an intrinsic part of it.

However, though it improves the

deterministic argument, chaos does so at the cost of meeting the
criterion for the improvement of the libertarian argument as
well.

The contribution of chaos to the libertarian argument will

now be summarized.
The steps for meeting the libertarian criterion are a little
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less manifest than they are for determinism.

The libertarians

begin by attacking the idea that determinism is an ultimate
truth; instead, they argue that it is a conventional truth, one
which cannot disprove the possibility of free will.

However,

this does not explain how the free will can be made to agree with
a world which appears to be governed by universal causality.
Accordingly, the criterion for improving the libertarian
model was to prove that the belief in universal causality could
be circumvented without breaking its appearance.

Furthermore,

this must be shown to be possible at the level of the brain
states which determine an individual's behavior, in accordance
with neurophysiological determinism.
By separating epistemic determinism from physical
determinism, chaos shows that brain states can be fundamentally
unpredictable.

It may also be the tool that the free will uses

in vetoing potentials for action, since an unmeasurable influence
by the free will could theoretically be blown up by chaos,
impacting brain states.

This has been referred to as a theory of

overdetermination or the Epicurean Swerve.

Dr. Libet's study

completes the model by showing that this disruption of brain
states could be the key to the action of the free will, as it
vetoes potentials for action.

The evidence indicating that chaos

is deeply involved in the operation of the brain backs these
conclusions.
The science of chaos does apparently meet the criterion set
down for the advancement of the libertarian argument.

We turn
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now to see how this may affect the philosophical debate, and the
implications are clear.
Since chaos seems to allow the possibility of free will,
many argue that its existence should be presumed.

After all,

attempts to prove the free will can only be shown not to break
the laws of universal causality, and in this the libertarians can
claim success.

Consequently, the libertarians can argue that it

is the determinists who have been defeated, not they.

As a

conventional truth, the libertarians argue that belief in free
will is arguably more useful than any deterministic definition in
breaking the supposed contradiction between freedom and
determinism and also better fits our traditional definition of
freedom.

Therefore, its existence should simply be presumed •

.

This is the essential difference between the deterministic
and libertarian arguments.

Whereas the determinists can claim

that chaos makes the free will unnecessary, the libertarians
claim that chaos makes it possible and therefore necessary.

In a

sense, both are right, but are looking at it from different
perspectives.

Scientifically, the idea of free will adds nothing

to our understanding of behavior, and the determinists can claim
that chaos explains the unpredictability of behavior in a
deterministic fashion.

Since it adds nothing scientifically, our

philosophical model should be adjusted.
On the other hand, the idea of free will does seem to add
something to our understanding of morality and therefore the
libertarians argue that the determinists must expand their model
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to include the causality of a free will.

Furthermore, while

chaos allows for a deterministic explanation of behavior, it also
opens the possibility of free will.

Since it is possible, the

libertarians argue that free will is necessary and should be
taken on faith until proven otherwise, which chaos implies cannot
happen.
It has been seen that chaos opens new avenues for
exploration in the free will debate.

By separating epistemic

determinism from physical determinism, chaos shows that it can
explain the unpredictability of determinism while accommodating
the need for libertarianism to get around universal causality.
This must be seen as a victory for the libertarians, since
science has traditionally not even allowed the possibility of
their view, but the determinists have had their argument
strengthened as well.
The argument over libertarianism and determinism is ancient,
and perhaps this paper is just more evidence as to why it has
been so difficult to come to any generally accepted conclusions
favoring one argument over the other.

By showing that neither

side of the debate can be defeated on empirical evidence, the
battle over free will and determinism may well be decided on the
periphery, on theoretical arguments over the truth of efficient
causation and on the purpose and form of science, for instance,
or perhaps on specific versions of free will, which are not dealt
with here.
Finally, I will allow that my conclusions are tentative for
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lack of research on the relationship between chaos and behavior.
Nonetheless, I believe that as the amount of information on chaos
grows it will be used by both determinists and libertarians alike
to justify their claims, but it will also insure that the
opposing viewpoint cannot be defeated.
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